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Abstract  
During the recent crisis, Greece experienced a severe contraction and rapid transformation in its 
labour relations and pay-setting system in both the private and public sectors. Although the 
quantity (employment) adjustments that followed have been well documented, the changes that 
were triggered in the wage structures of the two sectors remain largely unexplored. In this paper 
we examine these changes using Greek Labour Force Survey micro-data. We find a differential 
adjustment across sectors in terms of magnitude, timing, and structure. Despite general 
perceptions, adjustment in public sector wages has been slow and limited, with pre-crisis premia 
persisting throughout the period. Instead, the private sector recorded substantial adjustment, 
changing noticeably its valuation of worker and job characteristics and emerging from the crisis 
with a structure of returns that rewards more intensively marketable skills. This may be an 
important feature in the prospective recovery of the Greek economy. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the onset of its debt crisis, Greece has battled a deep recession with an array of measures 
that affected the private and public sector differentially. On casual observation, it may appear 
that most of the employment adjustment came from the private sector while wage adjustment 
concerned mainly public sector workers. In reality, however, wage adjustment in the private 
sector has been sizeable – not only due to the mounting unemployment but also due to radical 
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labour market reforms there, which involved a drastic cut in minimum wages and the full 
decentralisation of wage bargaining.  
The public sector wage cuts, implemented mainly in the early parts of the crisis, were meant to 
address the dual objective of supporting the government’s fiscal consolidation programme and 
rationalizing pay conditions in the sector. In turn, labour market interventions in the private 
sector came somewhat later and aimed at restoring international competitiveness and facilitating 
the adjustment of relative prices in the private economy. The pervasiveness of measures in both 
sectors is believed to have changed radically the landscape in the two segments of the labour 
market. Evidence on this, with regard to wage and employment outcomes, is by now well 
documented. For example, Tzannatos and Monogios (2013) report falls in public sector earnings 
of 22-40% (depending on method of calculation); while the OECD reports a cumulative drop in 
private sector real wages by some 13% (OECD, 2014). According to official data sources (see 
our discussion in section 2.3), the number of wage earners in the private sector declined by 
around half a million, while employment in the public sector declined by around half that 
number (albeit not dissimilarly in percentage terms). With regard to unemployment, Daouli et al 
(2014) show that the headline increase, from 8% in 2008 to 27% in 2013, was underpinned by a 
sudden increase in job-separations (with annual transitions from employment to unemployment 
rising from less than 2% in 2008 to over 5% already in 2011), while the job-finding rate of the 
unemployed collapsed more strongly somewhat belatedly (mainly in 2011-2012), from around 
25% to below 10%.  
Despite this evidence on aggregate labour market outcomes, very little is actually known with 
regard to changes in wage structures in the economy. In this paper we set out to examine these, 
as yet unexplored, changes. One goal is to answer the wider question of “who lost the most” – 
i.e., which of the two sectors was most severely affected (and how). Studies on other European 
countries have shown a variable range of changes in public sector wage premia with the crisis. 
Nikolic et al (2014) show that between 2008-2011 the premium increased in Croatia by almost 
13%, while in neighbouring Serbia it declined by 11.2% in the same period. In contrast, evidence 
from Romania suggests a drastic change, with the premium falling from 40% to -15%. In some 
cases, wage cuts were such that they typically increased within-sector inequality, affecting 
mostly women and the low-paid, e.g. in Hungary this affected more than 50% of public sector 
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employees below secondary education level (see the collection of studies in Vaughan-
Whitehead, 2013). In other cases the decline in the public sector premium was associated with 
increased compression in the distribution of public sector pay (e.g., as reported by Hospido and 
Moral-Benito, 2014, for Spain, where the public sector premium fell between 2008 and 2012 by 
some 25%). In Greece, pre-crisis public sector premia had been known to be large and persistent 
(Papapetrou, 2006; Giordano et al, 2011; Christofides and Michael, 2013; Christopoulou and 
Monastiriotis, 2014). It is thus important, given the size of the crisis in Greece and the 
pervasiveness of the reform measures that were followed, to examine how the public sector 
premium evolved during the crisis.  
A second and more pertinent goal is to examine changes in the way in which each sector valuates 
and rewards different labour market characteristics – in other words, the relative and absolute 
changes in the premia and penalties characterizing the wage structures of the two sectors. This 
fills an important gap not only in terms of the available literature but also in policy terms –
because it was exactly the objective to ‘rationalize’ these wage structures that motivated most of 
the labour market reforms during the period. Our analysis of these wage structure changes thus 
informs the discussion about the nature and effects of the labour market reforms in the country, 
during the crisis and prospectively.  
Our analysis covers the period from 2009, a year that marked the beginning of the crisis but saw 
no wage cuts or labour market reforms, until 2013, the year that followed the implementation of 
the bulk of labour market reforms and marked the height of the crisis. We document differences 
in wage dynamics across the public and private sectors both at the observational level and 
adjusting for individual and job characteristics. To explore the driving forces of these 
differences, we perform endogenous switching wage regressions which control for sector 
selection; we compare changes in the estimated returns to characteristics across sectors; and we 
inform our discussion by decomposing the wage changes to their detailed constituent 
components (price, composition, and selection effects).  
We find that the Greek experience differed from that in other European countries. Compared to 
private sector wages, public wages were less impacted during the Greek crisis. In result, public 
wage premia increased, especially for the low-paid workers. Both sectors registered substantially 
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negative horizontal price effects. However, wage adjustment in the private sector happened faster 
and was accompanied by substantial counteracting changes in the structure of returns both for 
individual characteristics (e.g., education) and on the aggregate (for worker and job 
characteristics at large). In contrast, wage changes in the public sector took longer to take effect 
and with modest changes in the valuation of worker and job characteristics.  
This differential adjustment of wages and employment (relative to the private sector as well as 
vis-à-vis the experience of other countries), could be in part at least attributed to the known 
institutional rigidities and legislative barriers of the Greek state as well as the strong union power 
and evidence of political patronage in the public sector. However, it would be rather imprudent 
to attribute this solely to union power or institutional rigidities. As the political science literature 
has demonstrated, adjustment in the public sector was significantly hindered by the resistance of 
successive governments to fully and wholeheartedly implement the reforms they were 
committing to (see, inter alia, Featherstone, 2011; Zahariadis, 2014). This is perhaps a more 
important factor, also explaining why adjustment in Greece has been so costly in comparison to 
other bailout countries (Monastiriotis, 2014). But it should also be noted that the rise in public 
premia is not unusual when the private sector is exposed to severe market and regulatory 
adjustment. For example, Bender and Heywood (2012) have recently shown that public wage 
premia increased in the USA after the recession of the early 1980s, as this coincided with a 
differential transformation in labour relations in the private and public sectors during that period 
(Katz, 2013). Although it goes beyond the purpose of our paper to empirically identify the causal 
factors underpinning our results, in our view it is the combination of the aforementioned factors 
– the institutional framework of the labour market, the political context and will, and the extent 
of the recession in the private economy – that account for the patterns unveiled by our analysis.  
 
2. Background 
2.1. A brief outline of the crisis 
For several years since Greece’s entry into the euro-zone (in 2001), economic performance in the 
country was on the surface impressive, boasting high growth rates, decreasing inflation, and 
upgrades in infrastructure. Under the surface, several problems persisted, including widespread 
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clientalism, corruption, a weak and uncompetitive industry, and market rigidities (Mitsopoulos 
and Pelagidis, 2011). The accumulated effects of these problems materialized in 2009 in the form 
of a 15.8% budget deficit and a subsequent climb in borrowing rates exceeding 10%. Isolated 
from the markets and unable to devaluate its currency, Greece negotiated an emergency bail-out 
agreement with its euro-zone partners and the IMF in May 2010, which was accompanied by 
strict conditionality over an extensive programme of structural reforms and fiscal consolidation 
measures. The bailout package (to the tune of €110 billion) allowed Greece to achieve an 
unprecedented fiscal adjustment, with the country’s fiscal deficit declining by almost 10 
percentage points within a year. This fiscal adjustment, achieved through significant tax hikes and 
cuts in public wages and pensions, created a deep recession to the Greek economy, which started 
declining with rates over 6% per annum (Monastiriotis et al., 2013). Delays and problems of 
implementation of structural reforms only acted to intensify the recessionary effect of fiscal 
consolidation, which was further exacerbated by the political instability that ensued, pushing 
Greece to a downward austerity-recession spiral well beyond what was observed in other bailout-
recipient countries in the Eurozone (Monastiriotis, 2014).  
Amidst continuing fiscal-economic problems and social-political turmoil, Greece received a 
second bailout package in early 2012 (worth €130 billion), which included further conditionality 
for the implementation of structural reforms, increasingly going beyond the realm of public 
administration and fiscal governance and aiming instead at restoring economic competitiveness 
through internal devaluation and the liberalisation of labour and product markets.
1
 In the labour 
market this included a drastic reduction in the minimum wage and full decentralisation of wage 
bargaining.  
Despite the continuing recession and mounting unemployment, Greece managed to record its first 
budget surplus at the end of 2013 and small positive growth rates in 2014. But the prolonged 
recession had transformed the debt crisis into a humanitarian one (e.g. Kentikelenis et al., 2011), 
so that these developments had little effect on public sentiment. In a snap election in January 
2015, the ‘pro-austerity’ parties in government lost power to a coalition of anti-austerity parties 
led by left-wing SYRIZA, who had promised to reverse the bulk of the measures implemented 
                                                          
1
 The full text of the ‘memoranda of understanding’ that accompanied the two bailout agreements can be found at: 
http://crisisobs.gr/en/repository/?ct=98&st=103.  
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since 2009, including the aforementioned reforms in the labour market. Subsequent negotiations 
with the country’s creditors have softened the new government’s stance, but economic and 
political uncertainty has remained and questions of a ‘Grexit’ have resurfaced. By result, it 
appears now that many of the measures implemented in the labour market over the last five years 
will remain in place for the foreseeable future.  
2.2. Wage reforms in the public and private sectors 
Prior to the crisis, wage determination in Greece was characterised by a combination of 
centralised bargaining and various forms of sectoral and occupational fragmentation. In the 
private sector, bargaining for minimum wages (for basic unskilled occupations) took place at the 
national level, while other salary categories were bargained separately (over and above the 
national bargain) by sectoral or occupational unions. Although these unions formally only 
represented employees in private firms with over 20 employees, coverage extended de facto to 
all employees in the sector/occupation (Tsarouhas, 2008; Zambarloukou, 2006). In the public 
sector in turn, pay differed among job contracts covered by private or public employment law. 
The former category was governed by the same rules as the private sector (and the majority had 
union representation), while the latter was represented by a thick net of, often job-specific, 
workers’ associations (all falling under the umbrella of the Chief Directorate of Public Employee 
Associations) but only at non-wage negotiations; the government unilaterally set the pay-scales 
for these jobs by law.  
This fragmentation, along with a tradition of clientelism and pork-barrel politics in the country 
(Lavdas, 2005), allowed individual public sector unions to pursue particularistic privileges, 
including non-competitive pay-raises (through the implementation of so-called “special pay 
scales” and the provision of different bonuses and pay-increments even to similar occupations 
across different Ministries), which resulted in a rather disparate web of non-uniform pay-scales 
and fragmented pay determination systems (GMIA, 2011). In result, public sector employees 
with identical skills and job content often earned very different wages across different segments 
of the public sector – and almost invariably significantly higher wages than their private sector 
counterparts even in similar sectors and occupations (Christopoulou and Monastiriotis, 2014). A 
manifestation of this can be found in the evolution of wages and productivity, prior to the crisis, 
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in sectors with strong public employment presence vis-à-vis the rest of the economy. As is 
shown in Figure 1, sectors associated to public employment had throughout the period lower 
productivity (measured in GDP per hour worked) and higher wages (measured in terms of total 
compensation per hour worked), while the gap had been widening in the years leading to the 
crisis.  
These conditions were abruptly interrupted with the beginning of the Greek crisis. Under 
pressure to reduce its public expenditure, in 2010 the Greek state unilaterally adopted an array of 
measures that have impinged on all areas of policy, including in the labour market (see 
Tzannatos and Monogios, 2013; Ioannou, 2013). With a series of laws voted in that year, the 
government introduced numerous public pay cuts
2
 which had an average effect of about 12% 
(NBG, 2010). As the crisis escalated in fall 2011, and amid a massive strike wave, the parliament 
passed another law to further rationalize the pay-scales.
3
 This second wave of cuts was meant to 
address the wage disparity within the public sector discussed above. For jobs in the narrow 
public sector paid according to general pay-scales, the 2011 law evened out the basic pay and its 
evolution with seniority. Although the basic pay was now set somewhat higher relative to prior 
levels, most benefits were abolished resulting in an overall reduction in total earnings. These new 
wage arrangements also became the model for private law contracts in public sector utilities and 
organizations, which were removed from the jurisdiction of collective bargaining. However, they 
did not apply for civil servants paid under special pay-scales, or for public law contracts in 
utilities and entities. These job categories were the object of the third wave of reforms that took 
place in 2012 as part of the agreement for the second bail-out package
4
. In that year, the 
government extended the implementation of the unified remuneration system to public sector 
utilities, and rationalized the wages of civil-servants based on equivalent criteria, though 
sustaining the distinction between unified and special pay-scales and the associated premium.  
Starting with the 2011 law, the government also reformed wages and industrial relations in the 
private sector. The law implemented a radical decentralisation of wage bargaining by annulling 
the ‘principle of the most favourable provision’, according to which enterprise-level bargaining 
could only deviate upwards from the national agreement (and was thus associated with wage 
                                                          
2
 Laws: Ν.3833/2010 (ΦΕΚ Α40), Ν.3845/2010 (ΦΕΚ Α65), Ν.3899/2010 (ΦΕΚ Α212). 
3
 Law Ν.4024/2011 (ΦΕΚ Α226). 
4
 Law: Ν.4093/2012 (ΦΕΚ Α222). 
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premia – Daouli et al., 2013). Also radical was the reduction in the monthly minimum wage that 
followed in 2012
5
. For those above the age of 24, the reduction was from 751 to 586 euros (22%) 
and for those under the age of 25 the reduction was from 751 to 510 euros (32%).  
2.3. Employment adjustments during the crisis 
As has been already noted, and well documented in public discussions, the combined effect of 
the crisis and of the austerity measures has been a substantial increase in unemployment, from 
8% in 2008 to 27% in late 2013. Most of this increase came from job-losses in the private sector 
and a collapse of new hires (Daouli et al, 2014), which obviously affected new labour market 
entrants most – thus contributing to the record rise in youth unemployment to 60% in January 
2013. By consequence, a wave of out-migration started taking effect, raising also concerns about 
a possible brain-drain: according to Eurostat data, emigration increased by a staggering 54% 
during 2010-2012 (from 119,985 to 154,435), with over half of the emigrants in the 20-39 age 
group. This trend, especially for youth migration, continued also in 2013/14 – a factor which 
presumably contributed to the sharp decline in youth unemployment rates more recently (down 
to 50% in late 2014 according to Eurostat).   
In contrast, job-losses in the public sector came mainly from the non-renewal of temporary 
contracts and early retirement (Zahariadis, 2014), for two reasons. On the ‘supply’ side, reforms 
in the pension system represented a net loss of future income for big groups of near-retirement 
public sector employees (Gupta 2012, Symeonidis 2013). On the ‘demand’ side, legal 
constraints
6
 and unwilling governments gridlocked public sector downsizing despite pressures 
from the country’s creditors. Thus, although the Greek government committed in 2012 to a 
cutback of at least 150 thousand permanent jobs (initially by 2015), actual dismissals throughout 
the period were measured in the low thousands. 
We illustrate the overall effect of these two developments, in the public and private sectors, in 
Figure 2. Panel A shows that employment loss in the private sector has been almost twice as high 
                                                          
5
 This was included in the same law (Ν.4093/2012) which rationalized wages of the civil-servants. 
6
 Article 103 of the Constitution states that a public employee cannot be dismissed from a position established by 
law – which is the case for all permanent public sector jobs – unless the position is abolished. In 2012 the 
government legislated job abolitions but the implementation of this was politically protracted and in cases 
overturned by the Constitutional Court (Zahariadis, 2014). The issue was meant to be dealt with by a constitutional 
reform planned for 2016, which has now been taken off the agenda.  
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as that in the public sector – with employment in the private sector nearing 1.5 million 
employees by 2013.
7
 It is worth noting that the decline in employment in the private sector 
intensified in the 2010-2012 period, before most of the wage and labour reforms in this sector 
took place, and it subsided somewhat thereafter – with the possible implication that some of 
these measures may have contributed to reducing the employment cost of the crisis.
8
 A similar 
conclusion can be drawn from the evolution of unemployment (for both age groups), as shown in 
panel B.  
Quite naturally, these developments have altered fundamentally the pay and valuation conditions 
in the Greek labour market, in both absolute (i.e., declining wages) and relative terms (relative 
valuation of characteristics and sorting within and across sectors). In the remainder of the paper 
we focus exclusively on these wage adjustments, keeping in the background the quantity changes 
that may have triggered, or resulted from, them.  
 
3. Empirical strategy 
3.1. Method 
We start by describing public sector wage premia both at the observational level and from 
Mincer wage regressions which control for worker and job characteristics. We report these raw 
and net premia at the mean and by decile of the wage distribution. We then account for the 
possible endogeneity between wages and the choice of sector by estimating an endogenous 
switching regression model, as developed by Van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1988). This model 
comprises two Mincer wage equations (one for each sector) and a selection equation sorting 
individuals across sectors, with jointly dependent errors
9
:  
ititit XlnW                          (1) 
                                                          
7
 As we discuss later, a similar pattern is observed with regard to hours of work, which declined sizeably in the 
private sector but actually increased, marginally, in the public sector.  
8
 Evidence for this, in relation to changes in the minimum wage legislation, is provided by Yannelis (2014).  
9
 This is essentially a two-stage procedure, analogous to the Heckman model. Our estimation is by a Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method, which fits the binary and continuous regressions simultaneously 
and makes the appropriate error adjustments. For details see Lokshin and Sajaia (2004). 
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itit2,,1it )ln(ln uZWWS privitpublit       (2) 
In (1), Wit is the monthly wage of individual i who is interviewed in year t, X is a vector of 
control variables, β the respective returns, and ε is a random error. In (2), S=1 if person i is in the 
public sector, )ln(ln ,, privipubli WW  denotes the public-private wage differential, Z is a vector of 
instruments that influence the choice of sector, and u is the error term. We report estimates of the 
above model separately for different calendar years.  
With the derived estimates, we subject the mean wage change from year t0 to year t1 to the 
classic Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique, which separates endowment and price effects 
as follows: 
00110101 itttitititit
X)()XX(WlnWln   t                (3) 
The first term in the right-hand side of (3) captures differences in worker characteristics valuated 
at t1 prices (i.e. it gives the endowment effect that would prevail if there were no differences in 
the structure of returns between the two calendar years, so that 
01 t
 t ), and the second term 
captures differences in the price of these characteristics expressed in t0 mean values. To obtain a 
detailed narrative of wage dynamics, we conduct the above decomposition for alternative time 
periods (2009-2013; 2009-2011; and 2011-2013) and by separating the characteristics of workers 
(education, experience
10
, marital status, whether has child/ren, foreign-born) from those of 
employers/jobs (sector, occupation, region, part-time contract, temporary contract, small firm, 
hours of work). Specifically, we identify the part of wage-changes that is due to (i) 
compositional changes in worker characteristics; (ii) compositional changes in job 
characteristics; (iii) changes in the returns to worker characteristics; (iv) changes in the returns to 
job characteristics; and (v) changes in the constant (which we interpret to reflect wage changes 
due to horizontal shifts in ‘baseline’ wages). Further, we compute a separate ‘selection’ effect 
which gives the part of the overall wage change that is accounted for by the way in which 
different employees select into different sectors (as captured in our selection equation). 
                                                          
10
 Although in our data we separately observe job tenure from general labour market experience, we chose not to 
include the former in our regressions due to the well-known issue of identifiability (Altonji and Williams 2005). Our 
results remain robust when we include tenure and tenure squared (available upon request). 
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Finally, we calculate the equivalent detailed decomposition at different deciles of the wage 
distribution, though we exclude the selection effect since econometric techniques for validly 
accounting for sample selection in the context of quantile regression are at early stages of 
development (e.g. Arellano and Bonhomme 2010; Huber and Melly 2011). To do this, we 
employ the recentered influence function (RIF) approach proposed by Firpo et al. (2009), which 
implements a transformation of the log wage so that its mean equals the quantile of interest. 
Using this function and assuming a linear relationship with the worker and job characteristics, 
we can generalize the Oaxaca decomposition of the mean gap to quantiles. However this 
linearity assumption is restrictive and potentially involves out-of-sample predictions. To address 
this limitation we employ the DiNardo et al. (1996) weighting approach which equalizes the 
empirical distributions of characteristics between the years compared.  
Specifically, our decomposition at the j-quantile (qtj) of log wages relies on the following 
regression: 
,X)(),RIF(lnW ititit   tjtj qq                       (4) 
where RIF(lnWit,qtj)=qtj+[j-dj]/flnW(qtj),  flnW(qtj) is the density function of lnWit computed at 
quantile qtj, and dj is a dummy variable that equals one if lnWit≤qtj  and zero otherwise. For t=t0 
we estimate (4) as a linear (OLS) regression, but for t=t1 we estimate a weighted least squares 
(WLS) specification, with the weights given by: 
)],ttPr()|tt/[Pr()]ttPr()|tPr(t[w(X) 0110  XX    (5) 
In (5), Pr(t=t1|X) is the conditional probability of an individual being interviewed in t1, which we 
derive by assuming a logit model. It then becomes straightforward to decompose the wage 
difference by decile into the Oaxaca-equivalent composition and price effects, as follows: 
]X))()(([]X)(X)([(
001011101 ititit jt
OLS
jt
WLS
jt
WLS
jt
OLS
jtjt qqqqqq                (6) 
Before we proceed, a note on unobserved sample selectivity is in order. Given that employment 
rates have been declining rapidly over the study period, the sample we analyse each year may be 
increasingly selected on the basis of characteristics for which we do not control in our 
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regressions. For example, the composition of our sample may be changing with respect to 
previous labour force status (e.g. past exposure to unemployment or inactivity), or soft/intangible 
skills (e.g. motivation, trustworthiness, entrepreneurialism). Because databases that collect wage 
data rarely include this type of information, selectivity on unobservables is a common problem 
when one analyses wage dynamics. Although we recognize the problem, we expect that it poses 
few challenges in our analysis. First, as noted already, the three main forces that have affected 
the employment composition during the Greek crisis is the progressive exclusion of the young 
from the labour market (since new hires have essentially frozen), retirement, and brain drain. 
These entail sample selectivity with respect to age and education, both of which we observe in 
our data (see also Monastiriotis and Martelli, 2013, for direct evidence on this). Second, research 
has shown that soft skills that are rewarded in the labour market are highly (though imperfectly) 
correlated with educational outcomes (Lundberg 2013). Such evidence allows confidence in our 
estimation results. 
3.2. Data and descriptive patterns 
In our empirical analysis we use individual-level data from the spring wave of the Greek Labour 
Force Survey (LFS), for the years 2009-2013. This is a quarterly household survey covering 
information on a range of personal, household and labour market characteristics, including 
regular monthly wages (reported in wage bundles which typically have a 100 euro range)
11
. Each 
wave contains approximately 30,000 working-age individuals, of which around two-fifths are 
wage earners – though this share drops as the crisis deepens.  
The LFS data manifest clearly the significant differences between the public and private sectors 
both statically and dynamically (Table 1). Relative to the private sector, the public sector 
consistently employs more women and more workers who are educated, experienced, natives, 
and married with children; and has lower rates of irregular (especially part-time) employment. 
During the crisis the share of the private sector in total employment decreased by 2.2 percentage 
points. Average years of schooling increased in both sectors, but average experience increased 
                                                          
11
Because the bundles differ slightly across waves, we have harmonised them into eight comparable categories. 
Following common practice, we take the mean value of the bundles as a proxy for each individual’s monthly wage. 
Although clearly imperfect, this is the only possible way to analyse wages in Greece and it has been shown by 
Christopoulou and Monastiriotis (2014) to produce robust estimates of Mincer equations when using alternative 
methods of estimation (OLS and interval regressions).  
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only in the private sector, reflecting the increasing job-finding difficulties for new labour market 
entrants and the soaring retirement ages. Part-time employment also increased substantially in 
this sector (but declined in the public sector); while the share of foreign-born declined. Average 
hours of work were higher in the private sector but have been constantly declining (with around 
1.8 hours of weekly work lost between 2009 and 2013), while in the public sector average 
weekly hours actually increased. In contrast, nominal wages have declined in both sectors but 
have remained higher in the public sector throughout the period.
 12
  
In real terms (Figure 3A), private wages declined almost linearly from the beginning of the 
crisis, while public wages fell only faintly over 2009-2011, sharply over 2011-2012, and slightly 
further in 2013. In other words, public wages declined with a significant delay – at least 
considering the immense pressures applied to public finances during the period. As a result, the 
raw public-private sector wage differential (Figure 3B), which stood at 32.7% in 2009, rose 
between 2009 and 2011, declined notably in 2012, but recovered significantly – and rather 
surprisingly – in 2013 (reaching 33.8% in that year).13 The equivalent differential in terms of 
hourly wages follows a similar pattern, but it is much larger in size due to the sectoral differences 
in hours of work.
14
 Of course compositional changes have exerted an influence on these trends. 
Controlling for such changes through an OLS regression on the pooled sample gives a somewhat 
different picture.
15
 The net differential appears to have risen from 8.8% in 2009 to 14.6% in 2011 
but to have subsequently dropped in 2013, though remaining higher than in 2009 (at 9.3%).
16
  
                                                          
12
 The rise of public nominal monthly wages in 2009-2011 may seem at odds with estimates of a significant cut in 
average wages during the period (e.g., NBG, 2010, estimated this at near 12%). Part of this disparity is explained by 
measurement, as our wage measure excludes annual bonuses. Another part is due to compositional changes of the 
public workforce: for example, a disproportionate outflow of temporary contract workers (which typically have 
lower wages) will tend to increase measured average wages despite the pay-cuts. We demonstrate this in Table A1 
in the online Appendix, which compares our estimates with data from external sources and shows that in all cases 
(including our data) the wage bill falls monotonically throughout the crisis, even when our mean wage increases. 
This latter discrepancy concerns only our descriptive statistics, as our regression analysis controls for compositional 
changes. 
13
 One may suspect that the hump-shaped pattern in public premia is driven by wages in the “wider” public sector 
which was subjected to fewer reforms and later on in the crisis. We show in Figure A1 in the online Appendix that, 
in fact, the pattern is most evident in the “narrow” public sector (i.e. public services) and in local government. 
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 See Figure A2 in the online Appendix. 
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 The full set of regression results is available in Table A2 in the online Appendix. 
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 Because our analysis does not take into account annual bonuses (for Christmas, Easter and paid holidays) which 
were significantly cut in the public sector (but not fully in the private sector), our results likely overestimate public 
sector premia. But given the largely horizontal nature of these bonuses (proportional to the monthly wage) this 
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The temporal evolution of public wage premia calculated at the mean may of course mask 
diverse patterns across the wage distribution. Thus, we next examine changes by wage decile, 
with the necessary forewarning that they may be noisy, since they derive from a wage variable 
that is reported in bundles. As Figure 4 shows, in the first half of the crisis private sector wages 
fell more or less uniformly across the wage distribution, though slightly more for the low-paid. 
In contrast, public wage changes in that period were unsystematic, and they were even positive at 
the 2
nd
 and 6
th
 deciles. Such wage hikes can be explained by the discontinuation of many 
temporary low-pay contracts in 2010 but, also, they may indicate that public sector 
administrators countered the early wage cuts by expediting internal promotion. In the second half 
of the crisis, private sector wages dropped dramatically at the lower tail of the distribution, 
reflecting the cut in minimum wages. All other workers saw smaller wage declines, though still 
higher than those in the earlier period, with those at the 8
th
 decile affected the least. Given the 
unification of the pay-scales that was applied in the largest part of the public sector during that 
period, the corresponding public wage changes were also negative and larger than before, but 
now formed a clear W-pattern, affecting less those at the tails and at the median of the wage 
distribution.  
These differential changes in sectoral wages across the distribution translate into differential 
patterns in public sector premia. We show this in Figure 5, where we plot net premia derived 
from quantile regressions on the pooled sample (full set of results available upon request). 
Comparing the light (2009) and dark (2013) solid lines, one can see small benefits for the low-
paid and important losses for the high-paid in the public sector relative to their private sector 
counterparts.  However, as with premia at the mean, changes over the full period conceal 
important changes across sub-periods. Over 2009-2011, driven by faster private wage 
adjustment, the net public premium increased substantially across the board, exceeding 20% for 
the low-paid. It was over 2011-2012, when the unified pay scales were applied, that the premium 
fell. In fact, in 2012, the premium is almost linearly decreasing across wage quantiles. Some of 
this fall was corrected in 2013.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
mostly affects our descriptive results: in principle, returns to sector-specific worker and job characteristics should be 
independent from non-regular annual bonuses. 
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4. Econometric analysis 
4.1. Wage structures and sector-selection 
Previous studies have shown that there is significant selection of workers between the public and 
private sectors in Greece. To account for selection, we follow the endogenous switching 
regression model and instrument the ‘choice’ of sector using an indicator of whether a worker 
has parents or a spouse employed in, or retired from, the public sector. Following Christopoulou 
and Monastiriotis (2014) and earlier studies cited therein, we hypothesise that this indicator 
(henceforth, ‘public history’) reflects both wider household preferences about the sector of 
employment and information/access advantages for public sector jobs.
17
  
The results suggest that before the crisis selection related to ‘public history’ has been significant 
(Table 2). We estimate that having a household member employed in the public sector in 2009 
was associated to a 43% higher probability of the individual being also employed in the public 
sector. Selection on this and correlated unobserved characteristics, however, did not affect wages 
for those individuals that obtained public-sector jobs (the ‘rho’ correlation coefficient is 
statistically insignificant). Instead, ‘public history’ translated to a wage penalty for those 
individuals who were ‘wrongly’ selected into the private sector: for them, we estimate a wage 
penalty in 2009 of 3% (‘lamda’ coefficient in the private-sector wage regression). Reading across 
columns, it is evident that this selection mechanism became weaker as the crisis progressed. In 
2011 the influence of the ‘public history’ variable for an individual’s selection into the public 
sector had declined to 37.6%, showing that, indeed, this variable reflected to a certain extent an 
accessibility issue. The private-sector penalty associated to possession of characteristics that 
selected an individual into the public sector almost doubled over this period, in turn suggesting 
that this sector was intensifying its wage sorting in favour of employees who possessed more 
private-sector-like characteristics. This effect, however, declined and became statistically 
                                                          
17
 As Table 1 shows, around 30% of public sector workers have ‘public history’, while the corresponding share for 
private sector workers is only 9%. Our identifying assumption is that public history affects sector selection but not 
sector-specific wages. Of course, it is plausible that it reflects unobserved characteristics common across family-
members (e.g. non-cognitive skills) that do affect wages, irrespective of sector selection. However, our data are 
generally unsupportive of this hypothesis. In Table A3 in the online Appendix, we show that public history does not 
predict wages conditional on the control variables in all cases apart from year 2013 in the public sector (where we 
never find significant selection effects). For a discussion on the performance of this instrument relative to other 
candidate instruments, see Christopoulou and Monastiriotis (2014). For sector-specific wage regressions unadjusted 
for selection, see Table A4 in the online Appendix. 
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insignificant by 2013, perhaps reflecting that with the pervasive job losses in the private sector, 
even the possession of unobserved characteristics more akin to the private sector was not 
sufficient to generate a wage advantage there. Consistently, the selection influence associated to 
public history declined further in that period to 31%. 
Among the other characteristics that contribute to sector-selection, a few present statistically 
significant changes which are worth discussing. The selection of women away from the public 
sector declined over time, as they were rapidly losing their jobs in the private sector, which 
traditionally protects men as the primary bread-winners. Likewise, the strong selection of non-
natives away from the public sector halved by 2011, again because private-sector job losses hit 
disproportionately non-natives, but re-emerged in 2013 as private-sector job-losses became more 
pervasive affecting more horizontally the population, irrespective of ethnicity. In a similar 
fashion, both part-time contracts (initially more pervasive in the private sector) and temporary 
contracts (initially more pervasive in the public sector) first diminished in the public sector but 
eventually recovered. These patterns make sense, as part-time and temporary public sector jobs 
were amongst the first to be shed away, and as many private-sector jobs were switched to part-
time or temporary status.  
The estimates of the second-stage wage regressions are also interesting. First, the female wage 
penalty has been consistently higher in the private sector throughout the crisis. Over 2009-2011, 
this penalty increased in the private sector and decreased in the public sector and, thus, the 
female disadvantage in the private sector initially intensified. However, this change was fully 
restored by 2013. Further, the early stages of the crisis saw fast convergence in the returns to 
education in the two sectors, with the public sector advantage (of some 20%) literally 
disappearing by 2011. This equalisation of the returns to education remained in 2013, with 
returns increasing notably in both sectors (by over 40% in total), showing the elevated 
significance of education not only for job-finding but also for one’s wage outcomes once 
employed. The experience premium also saw increases of similar magnitude. The sectoral 
differential in this premium, which was statistically indistinguishable from zero before the crisis, 
initially increased, as the returns to experience increased faster in the public sector. However, the 
private sector caught up with the public sector at the second half of the crisis.  
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With regard to household characteristics changes have been less dramatic. The premium 
associated with being married, which was statistically equal across sectors for the duration of the 
crisis, remained rather unchanged. The premium associated with having children, which was 
significant only in the private sector, declined in the latter phase of the crisis and became 
statistically insignificant there also. In contrast, there is a significant differentiation between the 
two sectors with regard to the foreign-born penalty. While up to 2011 both sectors equally 
penalized foreign workers, in 2013 the public sector seems to offer a foreign-born premium (at 
the almost implausible rate of 18.6%). This result reflects the significant compositional changes 
that took place in the sector with regard to non-native employment, presumably with the public 
sector maintaining in its ranks only the highest-skilled/top-paid among its non-native 
employees.
18
  
Among the job characteristics, part-time and temporary contracts entailed sizeable wage 
penalties which were statistically higher in the public sector over the entire period. These 
penalties initially deepened but eventually recovered in all cases apart from the temping penalty 
in the private sector, which increased throughout (by a total of 35%).  In turn, the small-firm 
penalty, after an initial increase in both sectors, fell to its original levels in the public sector but 
more than doubled in the private sector, clearly reflecting the deteriorating demand conditions in 
the country and the impact that this had, disproportionately, to small businesses. The overall 
effect of the fall in demand is also reflected in the evolution of the estimated intercepts (showing 
‘baseline’ wages net of individual and job characteristics), with the disadvantage observed for 
the private sector growing from 4.7% in 2009 to 8.4% in 2011 and falling slightly to 6.1% in 
2013, despite the fact that the public sector intercept also declined (by 7.2% over the entire 
period compared to 8.7% in the private sector).  
Note that the decline in the estimated intercepts is notably lower than the decline in actual wages 
reported by official sources (and also recorded in our data as described in the previous section). 
This reaffirms our earlier conclusion that compositional and valuation changes have also been an 
important part of the story of labour market adjustment in Greece during the crisis. To examine 
these, we proceed with our decomposition analysis.  
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 Note from Table 1 that the non-native share in the public sector had more than halved by 2013, representing just 
0.5% of total employment in the sector. 
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4.2. Decomposition of wage changes 
We begin with the decompositions at the mean of the wage distribution (Table 3). The results 
corroborate the earlier finding that the impact of selection, although observable, is not 
particularly sizeable. Selection amplified total wage adjustment in the public sector by a non-
trivial 5.3% (0.0137 log-points), but in the private sector the effect was opposite and minimal (-
1.7% or 0.0056 log-points). Interestingly, this effect is driven entirely by developments in the 
second phase of the crisis, as the effect of selection in the two sectors in the first phase of the 
crisis worked in the opposite direction.  
Having net out the selection effects, we find that the observed downward wage adjustment is 
more than fully explained by changes in the price components. While in almost all cases the 
endowment effects moved in the opposite direction, they were nowhere near sufficient to 
counter-balance the substantial wage adjustment in the country. In the public sector, endowment 
effects worked against downward wage adjustment by a factor of 18.7% (0.0484 log-points); 
whereas in the private sector they were negligible (at 0.7% of the raw difference). As the detailed 
decomposition results show, the reason for this difference is that, while in the public sector 
compositional changes both in worker and job characteristics tended to push wages up, in the 
private sector these effects pushed in opposite directions, largely offsetting each other. Put 
differently, workforce quality improved with the crisis in both sectors, but job quality increased 
in the public sector and decreased in the private sector. Concerning the timing of these changes, 
the largest part of the compositional adjustment in the public sector took place early on in the 
crisis, which reflects again that this sector shed many temporary and part-time (i.e. low-skill and 
low-pay) jobs at that time. In the private sector, the deterioration in job quality happened 
immediately as soon as the crisis started and continued apace thereafter, but improvements in 
worker quality were more pronounced in the later phase. 
The movement of the price components was similarly non-uniform, despite the overall 
downward influence (by 113% and 103% in the two sectors, respectively). In the public sector, 
returns to worker characteristics pushed wages up while returns to job characteristics worked in 
the opposite direction. In absolute value, these effects were similar (corresponding to 30% and 
28% of the raw wage change, respectively) and thus cancelled out. In contrast, in the private 
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sector, the returns to both worker and job characteristics worked to increase wages. Favourable 
worker characteristics were valued higher after the crisis (in ceteris paribus terms), so that they 
counteracted wage declines by a very large 60.8%, while the corresponding effect of job 
characteristics was even higher, at 66.5% of the raw wage change. In both cases, the main 
component driving the downward movement of wages has been the price effect corresponding to 
the constant, which gives a measure of the shock experienced in each sector. The effect is large 
in the public sector (at -0.2997 it represents a ‘baseline’ adjustment of 115.5% of the total raw 
change) but it is really devastating in the private sector (-0.7406 or 230% of the corresponding 
raw change), thus showing how the negative demand shock, but also adjustment to it, was more 
sizeable in that sector.  
When comparing sub-periods we find that this private sector shock increased as the crisis 
deepened and as wage-setting was liberalised, while the countervailing effects remained on 
average roughly unchanged. The only difference is that the worker price-effects became more 
pronounced in the second half of the crisis while the job price-effects were more pronounced in 
the first half (as did the corresponding endowment effects). On the contrary, the negative 
‘baseline adjustment’ in public wage was equally sizeable throughout the crisis, but the 
countervailing forces were stronger in the first half of the crisis and weaker in the second half. 
Although the initial wage-cut did take effect (as seen in the decline of the ‘baseline’ component 
by 0.15 log-points) a large part of it was counterbalanced by the simultaneous move towards a 
more favourable valuation of worker characteristics (equivalent to a total-wage rise of 0.16 log-
points) as well as by the smaller improvements in the endowment components. In a way this 
explains why policy efforts, which were hugely unpopular and costly in political terms, took so 
long to take effect. In contrast, when the valuation of worker characteristics was rationalised 
(in/after 2011), actual public sector wages declined much faster.  
To delve deeper in these patterns, we turn to the decomposition results by wage decile, which we 
report in Figure 6. As with the results at the mean of the distribution, we find that composition 
effects due to changes in worker and job characteristics had a minor contribution to wage 
changes across deciles; price effects due to worker and job characteristics had a moderate and 
mostly positive contribution; and the constant effect had the highest negative influence in both 
sectors. However, the mean decompositions conceal that, over 2009-2013, price effects due to 
worker and job characteristics were in fact negative at the low deciles in both sectors. In contrast, 
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worker and job price effects favoured workers at the 3
rd
-5
th
 wage deciles in the public sector, and 
those at the upper end of the distribution in the private sector, i.e. exactly where the negative 
constant effect was highest. This suggests that the way the public sector adjusted its rewards to 
worker and job characteristics during the crisis favoured the low-paid, while private sector 
adjustments favoured the high-skilled highly-paid workers. Admittedly, the constant effect in the 
public sector was positive at the very low wage deciles, and overall more sizeable than what the 
decomposition at the mean suggests. This is more obvious when one compares sub-periods, with 
the mean decompositions suggesting that the constant effect was stable over time but the quantile 
decomposition showing a huge increase over time (from a nearly positive effect over 2009-2011 
to a highly negative effect in 2011-2013). We attribute these results to underlying selection 
effects, for which we have not controlled.
19 
Because they are less affected by selection bias, the 
results from the private sector are more reliable. These results suggest that the crisis (i.e. the 
‘baseline adjustment’ captured by the constant) initially affected wages more or less uniformly 
across the wage distribution but, as the crisis escalated, those who were affected most were at the 
tails of the wage distribution; i.e. the minimum wage earners and the high-skill highly-paid 
employees.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The crisis in Greece has been largely presented as a crisis of, and in, the public sector. Indeed, 
public sector workers saw remarkable wage cuts, while an effective hiring freeze and some 
downsizing was also implemented, as the country fought to consolidate its public finances. 
Nevertheless, the private sector was also, and in some respects more deeply, affected. Quantity 
adjustments were particularly pronounced, with around one million jobs lost in the space of four 
years, average weekly hours declining by as much as 5% and unemployment more-than-tripling 
to 27% in 2013. But wages in the private sector were also severely affected, as they fell faster 
and deeper than in the public sector.  
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 We base this inference on decomposition analysis at the mean without adjustment for sector selection, which we 
report in Table A5 (see online Appendix). As this table shows (and in comparison with Table 3), failure to control 
for selection significantly biases the magnitude of the estimated price effects in the public sector. In particular, when 
we do not correct for selection bias, the constant effect appears significantly larger overall, and much larger in the 
second half of the crisis relative to the first half, which is exactly what we find in the quantile decompositions. 
Importantly, correcting for selection does not affect the direction of the price effects. 
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Motivated by these developments, in this paper we utilised individual-level data from the Greek 
LFS to examine the compositional and valuation dynamics underpinning the observed wage 
adjustments not only over the whole period (2009-2013) but also across two constituent sub-
periods. This was not an arbitrary choice. Despite its severity, the Greek crisis unfolded rather 
slowly and in a prolonged fashion. Between 2009 and 2011, the (centre-left) government of the 
time imposed fiscal austerity measures (including public-sector wage-cuts) with relative brevity, 
facing huge opposition both by the public and in parliament. Following the loss of confidence of 
this government in November 2011, the country was led by a coalition government which 
implemented further cuts in the public sector and a much more pervasive programme of labour 
market reforms. The political turbulence of 2011 had a devastating effect on the Greek economy, 
as fears about a sudden exit from the Eurozone led to a further collapse in demand and 
investment, and an immense liquidity problem throughout the economy. Thus, in more than one 
ways, the crisis in Greece has had at least two phases – and in many respects it can be argued to 
have had also two faces, one for the private and one for the public sector.  
The results from our regression and decomposition analyses confirm these observations. Among 
our headline findings, the one that perhaps stands out concerns the overall wage adjustment 
between sectors and periods: in the public sector monthly regular wages took a long time to 
adjust and only fell significantly after 2011; in contrast, the corresponding wages in the private 
sector were affected faster and overall more deeply, even prior to the wave of measures that 
deregulated wage bargaining and lowered minimum wage-floors. Importantly, this result remains 
not only when we control for sector-selection but also when we control for the actual changes to 
workforce/job characteristics. In all cases, wage adjustment in the private sector appears to be 
larger and to have started earlier compared to the public sector – despite the fact that measured 
productivity in the private sector declined slower (and was, to start with, more closely aligned to 
wages) than in the public sector. In result, and against common perception, the monthly public 
wage premium increased in the early phase of the crisis and only started falling after 2011, 
though never decreasing below its 2009 level. In fact, the fall in public wage premia affected 
mostly the least privileged public sector workers, i.e. those in high-skill high-pay jobs who 
before the crisis were earning the lowest wage premia. In contrast, the wage reforms tended to 
protect public employees at the lower end of the wage distribution; that is, those who were 
already the most privileged compared to their private sector counterparts. 
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Underneath this finding, however, are substantial differences in the way in which prices have 
adjusted in the two sectors. Our results suggest that in the private sector demand pressures were 
strong and continuous, affecting initially all skill levels and later the high skilled. Importantly, 
however, these pressures were partly offset by an intensification of wage-sorting, with a 
significant rise in the returns to marketable workforce characteristics, including most notably the 
returns to schooling. In the public sector in turn, adjustment was slower and more muted in the 
beginning of the crisis, as this sector also rewarded worker characteristics higher than before 
(and saw some improvement in the composition of workers and jobs). After 2011, however, the 
rationalisation of pay-scales in that sector led to a relative reduction in the price/valuation of 
marketable workforce characteristics, impacting mostly the high-skilled.  
The steeper wage adjustment in the private sector (where misalignment from labour productivity 
in the pre-crisis years seems to have been lower) and the persistence of the public sector 
premium, may suggest that aggregate wage adjustments during the crisis were not fully in tune 
with the real needs of the labour market. However, not all observed changes are discouraging. 
The changes in returns in the private sector, in particular, are a rather positive development, as 
returns in this sector have been traditionally low, thus acting as a disincentive to seeking private-
sector dependent employment and further reinforcing the selection of the more skilled and more 
educated into the public sector. Thus, although, unlike in some other countries, the crisis did not 
eliminate the public sector premium, it nevertheless seems to have instigated a process of 
convergence in the returns to key marketable worker characteristics – especially education and 
labour market experience. The correction of these imbalances may be the most important, and 
perhaps the only, ‘good news’ coming out from the crisis for the Greek labour market.  
It remains to be seen whether these changes represent a new equilibrium or if they will be short-
lived – either because of further future adjustments in the economy or because of wider policy 
developments in Greece. It is of course to be expected that, with economic recovery at some 
point in the future, private sector wages may recover faster and thus the public sector premium 
may decline. It is less easy to foretell whether the observed changes in the structure of returns 
will also be scooped away in a future recovery. For all this, much depends of course on the wider 
situation in the country following the events of June/July 2015. Either way, the patterns revealed 
in our analysis offer an important insight into the price changes that have taken place in Greece 
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during the first five years of the crisis. These insights are of course of academic value in their 
own right, but may also be crucial for informing future policy-making in the country. 
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Figure 1. Measures of productivity and unit labour cost by sector (in nominal euros) 
 
Notes: Raw data are from Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database), author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 2. Employment and unemployment outcomes over 2009-2013 
 
Notes: Data on public sector employment are from the Ministry of Administrative Reform 
(http://apografi.yap.gov.gr/apografi/Flows_2009_2013.htm) . All other data are from the Eurostat 
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database). 
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Figure 3. Wage patterns over 2009-2013 at the mean of the wage distribution 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Change in public and private wages across the wage distribution in selected 
periods 
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Figure 5. Public wage premia net of worker and job characteristics across the wage 
distribution by calendar year 
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Figure 6. Decomposition of wage-changes across the wage distribution 
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Table 1. Weighted means and frequencies of selected variables by sector and year 
 
Public sector  Private sector 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Females 0.461 0.469 0.464 0.459 0.457  0.415 0.421 0.423 0.439 0.431 
Education in years 14.78 14.96 15.14 15.24 15.45  12.42 12.56 12.75 13.16 13.14 
Experience in years 21.50 21.62 22.11 22.25 21.88  18.69 19.08 19.27 19.15 19.74 
Married/Cohabitating 0.678 0.688 0.702 0.694 0.703  0.555 0.572 0.570 0.574 0.596 
Has child/ren 0.437 0.434 0.465 0.439 0.448  0.346 0.366 0.361 0.366 0.392 
Foreign born 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.007 0.005  0.199 0.192 0.199 0.171 0.166 
Part-time worker 0.029 0.026 0.024 0.021 0.020  0.066 0.074 0.082 0.110 0.140 
Temporary worker 0.097 0.094 0.070 0.067 0.080  0.134 0.146 0.149 0.118 0.118 
Small firm 0.212 0.203 0.208 0.169 0.153  0.563 0.564 0.562 0.520 0.509 
Production sectors: secondary
 0.070 0.064 0.054 0.056 0.057  0.328 0.305 0.275 0.245 0.236 
Production sectors: tertiary
 0.919 0.928 0.938 0.936 0.936  0.646 0.662 0.694 0.720 0.727 
Occupation: White collar 0.788 0.790 0.813 0.808 0.793  0.553 0.570 0.596 0.637 0.636 
Occupation: Blue collar 0.153 0.147 0.125 0.130 0.136  0.447 0.430 0.404 0.362 0.364 
Nominal monthly wage in euros 1322 1373 1388 1150 1107  996.5 1000 983.2 900.1 827.5 
Weekly hour of work  36.12 36.10 36.22 36.96 37.20  41.40 41.08 40.65 39.98 39.61 
Public history 0.292 0.295 0.289 0.265 0.274  0.094 0.096 0.094 0.092 0.087 
Observations 5,633 5,527 4,694 3,505 3,212  9,746 9,659 7,826 5,677 5,065 
Notes: Public sector includes public services, public bodies, local governments, public utility enterprises, public or public-controlled banks, and public-controlled firms. Reference 
production sector is primary, and reference occupation category is armed forces.  
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Table 2. Public-private wage structures under endogenous sector selection in selected years 
 
2009  2011 
 
2013 
 
Public Private Selection  Public Private Selection 
 
Public Private Selection 
Female -0.0666*** -0.1355*** -0.2126***  -0.0475*** -0.1461*** -0.1426*** 
 
-0.0632*** -0.1182*** -0.1207** 
 
[0.0081] [0.0075] [0.0428]  [0.0082] [0.0080] [0.0459] 
 
[0.0107] [0.0116] [0.0580] 
Education 0.0192*** 0.0153*** 0.0603***  0.0208*** 0.0202*** 0.0512*** 
 
0.0274*** 0.0233*** 0.0595*** 
 
[0.0016] [0.0012] [0.0079]  [0.0017] [0.0014] [0.0082] 
 
[0.0022] [0.0020] [0.0103] 
Experience 0.0167*** 0.0148*** 0.0484***  0.0186*** 0.0140*** 0.0525*** 
 
0.0235*** 0.0242*** 0.0360*** 
 
[0.0017] [0.0011] [0.0062]  [0.0016] [0.0013] [0.0070] 
 
[0.0026] [0.0020] [0.0097] 
Experience^2 -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0003***  -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0003** 
 
-0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0001 
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0001]  [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0001] 
 
[0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0002] 
Married 0.0381*** 0.0514*** -0.0550  0.0444*** 0.0696*** -0.0238 
 
0.0368*** 0.0545*** 0.0159 
 
[0.0104] [0.0085] [0.0504]  [0.0104] [0.0102] [0.0554] 
 
[0.0133] [0.0142] [0.0660] 
Children 0.0023 0.0267*** 0.0570  -0.0027 0.0425*** 0.0590 
 
-0.0045 0.0223* 0.0441 
 
[0.0090] [0.0080] [0.0455]  [0.0090] [0.0094] [0.0504] 
 
[0.0116] [0.0135] [0.0595] 
Non-Greek -0.1057** -0.1194*** -0.7423***  -0.1523*** -0.1289*** -0.3949*** 
 
0.1865* -0.1189*** -0.6820*** 
 
[0.0451] [0.0094] [0.1208]  [0.0499] [0.0114] [0.1296] 
 
[0.1084] [0.0182] [0.2079] 
Part-time -0.6128*** -0.4314*** -1.2806***  -0.6899*** -0.5469*** -1.4868*** 
 
-0.6583*** -0.4581*** -1.4548*** 
 
[0.0490] [0.0245] [0.1075]  [0.0520] [0.0259] [0.1289] 
 
[0.0636] [0.0299] [0.1508] 
Temporary -0.2902*** -0.0744*** 0.1648***  -0.3340*** -0.0951*** 0.0769 
 
-0.2583*** -0.1001*** 0.1924** 
 
[0.0209] [0.0110] [0.0623]  [0.0230] [0.0123] [0.0717] 
 
[0.0276] [0.0190] [0.0918] 
Small firm -0.0294*** -0.0460*** -0.5090***  -0.0602*** -0.0645*** -0.4570*** 
 
-0.0276** -0.1121*** -0.5640*** 
 
[0.0095] [0.0069] [0.0401]  [0.0097] [0.0076] [0.0450] 
 
[0.0136] [0.0116] [0.0589] 
Weekly hours 0.0027*** 0.0075*** -0.0489***  0.0009 0.0093*** -0.0464*** 
 
0.0049*** 0.0098*** -0.0316*** 
 
[0.0008] [0.0006] [0.0034]  [0.0008] [0.0007] [0.0039] 
 
[0.0011] [0.0010] [0.0042] 
Constant 6.5033*** 6.2000*** -0.1933  6.5144*** 5.9286*** -1.1197*** 
 
6.0334*** 5.6631*** -2.1980*** 
 
[0.0661] [0.0521] [0.2832]  [0.0678] [0.0570] [0.3276] 
 
[0.1375] [0.0841] [0.4140] 
Public history   0.4306***    0.3766*** 
 
  0.3101*** 
 
  [0.0473]    [0.0515] 
 
  [0.0645] 
Rho -0.0793 -0.0997**   -0.0510 -0.1417** 
 
 
-0.0709 -0.1474  
 
[0.0554] [0.0483]   [0.0474] [0.0705] 
 
 
[0.0522] [0.0995]  
Lamda -0.02146 -0.02972   -0.01235 -0.04351 
 
 
-0.01855 -0.05357  
Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: Sector dummies, occupation dummies, region dummies. Observations are 15379 in year 2009, 
12520 in 2011, and 8277 in 2013. The Wald test statistics [and corresponding p-values] for the independence of the selection equations are 6.391 [0.041] in 2009; 5.364 [0.068] 
in 2011; and 4.184 [0.123] in 2013. Rho (ρ) is the correlation coefficient between the error terms in the selection equation and the relevant wage equation. Multiplying this with 
the standard deviation of the errors of the wage equation (σu) returns the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio (λ), which shows whether selectivity impacts directly on 
individuals’ wages. Since σu > 0, the sign of the coefficient on λ is determined solely by ρ. 
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Table 3. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of mean real wage changes by period, sector and type of characteristics  
  Full period  2009-11  2011-13 
  Public Private  Public Private  Public Private 
Raw wage difference   -0.2594 [0.0006] -0.3222 [0.0006]  -0.0215 [0.0006] -0.1073 [0.0005]  -0.2379 [0.0006] -0.2149 [0.0007] 
Selection-adjusted difference -0.2457 [0.0012] -0.3277 [0.0008]  -0.0407 [0.0010] -0.1045 [0.0007]  -0.2050 [0.0011] -0.2232 [0.0009] 
Selection effect -0.0137  0.0056   0.0192  -0.0028   -0.0329  0.0084  
Endowment effects               
 Total 0.0484 [0.0005] 0.0028 [0.0005]  0.0367 [0.0004] -0.0071 [0.0004]  0.0128 [0.0005] 0.0038 [0.0005] 
 Worker 0.0252 [0.0003] 0.0377 [0.0002]  0.0177 [0.0002] 0.0132 [0.0002]  0.0053 [0.0002] 0.0216 [0.0002] 
 Job 0.0232 [0.0004] -0.0349 [0.0004]  0.0190 [0.0003] -0.0203 [0.0003]  0.0076 [0.0004] -0.0179 [0.0004] 
Price effects               
 Total -0.2941 [0.0012] -0.3305 [0.0007]  -0.0774 [0.0010] -0.0973 [0.0006]  -0.2178 [0.0011] -0.2270 [0.0007] 
 Worker 0.0787 [0.0051] 0.1958 [0.0029]  0.1626 [0.0043] 0.0855 [0.0024]  -0.0817 [0.0051] 0.1132 [0.0031] 
 Job -0.0731 [0.0042] 0.2143 [0.0030]  -0.0878 [0.0035] 0.1458 [0.0047]  0.0114 [0.0044] 0.0717 [0.0049] 
 Constant -0.2997 [0.0078] -0.7406 [0.0040]  -0.1522 [0.0062] -0.3287 [0.0051]  -0.1475 [0.0078] -0.4119 [0.0056] 
Notes: Reported wage gap is in the logged wages. Analytical standard errors (calculated by the Delta method) are in brackets. Worker characteristics are: female, education, experience, marital 
status, whether has child/ren, foreign-born. Job characteristics are: sector, occupation, region, part-time contract, temporary contract, small firm, hours of work). Coefficients of dummy 
variables adjusted to reflect deviations from the mean rather than from the reference category (i.e., they sum up to zero over all categories). 
 
 
 
 
